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Minority game is a simple-mined econophysical model capturing the cooperative behavior among
selfish players. Previous investigations, which were based on numerical simulations up to about 100
players for a certain parameter α in the range 0.1 <
∼
α <
∼
1, suggested that memory is irrelevant
to the cooperative behavior of the minority game in the so-called symmetric phase. Here using a
large scale numerical simulation up to about 3000 players in the parameter range 0.01 <
∼
α <
∼
1,
we show that the mean variance of the attendance in the minority game actually depends on the
memory in the symmetric phase. We explain such dependence in the framework of crowd-anticrowd
theory. Our findings conclude that one should not overlook the feedback mechanism buried under
the correlation in the history time series in the study of minority game.
PACS numbers: 89.65.Gh, 05.70.Fh, 89.75.-k
INTRODUCTION
Minority game (MG) [1, 2] is the most studied econo-
physical model capturing the minority seeking behavior
of independent selfish players. MG is a repeated game
of N players, each picking one out of two alternatives
independently in every time step based on the publicly
posted minority choices of the previous M turns. Those
correctly picking the minority choice are awarded one
mark while the others are deducted one. The aim of each
player is to maximize his/her own mark. To help play-
ers making their choices, each of them are assigned once
and for all S deterministic strategies. Here, each strat-
egy is a map from the set of all possible minority choices
of the previous M turns, which we call the history, to
the set of the two alternatives. The performance of each
strategy is evaluated according to its virtual score, which
is defined as the hypothetical mark it would got if the
strategy were used throughout the game. Among the S
assigned strategies, every player follows the suggestion of
the one with the highest current virtual score to choose
an alternative. (In case of a tie, a player randomly uses
one of his/her current best working strategies.) [1, 3]
The number of possible strategies in MG equals 22
M
.
Nonetheless, out of these 22
M
strategies, only 2M+1 of
them are significantly different. These significantly dif-
ferent strategies formed the so-called reduced strategy
space. In fact, for a fixed S and up to first order approx-
imation, the dynamics of MG is robust with α, which is
the ratio of the reduced strategy space size 2M+1 to the
number of strategies at play NS. [2, 3]
The attendance of an alternative A(t) at turn t is
defined as the number of players choosing that alter-
native in that turn. Since there is no prior bias in
choosing the two alternatives in MG, 〈A(t)〉t,ξ = N/2
where the average is taken over time t and initially as-
signed strategies ξ. In contrast, the variance of atten-
dance per player averaged over initially assigned strate-
gies,
〈
σ2(A(t))
〉
ξ
/N , is a more instructive quantity to
study. (We write
〈
σ2(A(t))
〉
ξ
as σ2 and call it simply
the variance of attendance from now on when confusion
is not possible.) Numerical simulation shows that, over
a wide range of parameters, the σ2/N against α curve
is lower than the value in which all players make their
choices randomly. This implies that these selfish and
independent players maximize their own marks cooper-
atively. More importantly, a cusp is found at α = αc;
this second order phase transition point αc divides the
parameter space into the so-called symmetric (α < αc)
and asymmetric (α > αc) phases [4].
The first numerical study on the effect of history con-
cerning the dynamics and cooperative behavior of MG
was carried out by Cavagna using N = 101, who sug-
gested that memory is irrelevant in MG. That is to say,
the σ2/N against α curve is unaltered if we replace the
history in each turn with a randomly and independently
generated M -bit string, while keeping the virtual score
calculation method unchanged [5]. (From now on, we
denote the original MG and the one played using ran-
dom history strings by MGreal and MGrand respectively.)
Later on, by exploring a wider range of parameters in
their numerical simulations, Challet and Marsili pointed
out that history is irrelevant if and only if α < αc. As
long as the occurrence of history is uniform, σ2/N should
not change when we replace the history with a randomly
and independently generated time series of M -bit string.
[6] Furthermore, Lee argued that although the time se-
ries of the attendance shows a strong periodic signal, this
signal does not affect the volatility of the attendance [7].
To summarize, the current understanding is that mem-
ory plays no role on the volatility in the symmetric phase
of MG.
In this paper, we perform a large scale numerical simu-
lation of MG played using real and random histories with
2up to 3232 players for 0.01 <∼ α
<
∼ 10. Our simulation
results show that memory is in fact relevant in the sym-
metric phase whenever α <∼ 0.2. Specifically, we discover
that in such a low value of α, the σ2/N against α curves
corresponding to the games played using real and random
histories split. We explain this split by crowd-anticrowd
theory developed by Hart et al. [8, 9] and argue that
finite size effect prevents earlier investigations from re-
vealing this discrepancy. Finally, we report two scaling
relations in the symmetric phase of MG and explain their
origin.
NUMERICAL RESULTS
All the σ2’s reported in our simulation are averaged
over 1000 independent runs. And in each run, the vari-
ance of attendance is computed from the attendance of
15000 consecutive turns after the system equilibrates.
Furthermore, we looked at the attendance time series
over at least 8 × 106 iterations in about 50 independent
runs with various values of α to verify that the system
has indeed equilibrated. Our computation requires about
7 Gflops yr of instructions.
In Fig. 1, we plot σ2/N against α for different values
of N for both the MG played using real and random his-
tories. By putting N = 101, we successfully reproduce
the two σ2/N against α curves for MGreal and MGrand
obtained by Challet and Zhang in Ref. [6] in the range
of 0.1 <∼ α
<
∼ 10. In fact, these two curves coincide in the
symmetric phase. Surprisingly, by increasing the number
of players N , σ2/N for MGreal is consistently higher than
that of MGrand for α <∼ 0.2. Furthermore, Fig. 1b shows
that for a fixed α <∼ 0.2, σ
2/N for MGreal increases as N
increases. In contrast, we find that the σ2/N against α
curve for MGrand is independent ofN . Thus, the discrep-
ancy between the two volatilities increases with N when
α <∼ 0.2. (Although the values of N used in all curves
reported in this paper are in the form 2k × 101 for some
integer k, our numerical simulation shows that the same
conclusions are reached to the case of odd N .)
From the above discussions, MGrand follows the scaling
relation
σ2
rand
N
∼ f(α, S) (1)
in the symmetric phase (α < αc), where σ
2
rand is the vari-
ance of the attendance for MGrand and f is a scaling func-
tion depending only on α and S. Moreover, Fig. 2 shows
that, for a fixed memory size M , the value of σ2/N2 is
independent of N in the symmetric phase. That is to say,
σ2
real
N2
∼ greal(M,S) > grand(M,S) ∼
σ2
rand
N2
(2)
provided that α < αc, where σ
2
real
is the variance of atten-
dance for MGreal and gi’s are scaling functions depending
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FIG. 1: A plot of σ2/N against α by varying M with S =
2. Fig. 1a compares the dependence of history for N = 101
(insert) and 3232 (main plot). We represent the MGreal and
MGrand data by triangles and squares respectively. Fig. 1b
shows the dependence of σ2/N on N for MGreal.
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FIG. 2: A plot of σ2 against N2. Each curve is drawn by
joining σ2 for different N2 at a fixed M with S = 2.
on M and S only.
THE CROWD-ANTICROWD EXPLANATION
The above numerical findings can be explained by the
crowd-anticrowd theory proposed by Hart et al. using
the notion of reduced strategy space [8, 9]. Recall that
decisions made by two distinct strategies in a reduced
strategy space are either mutually anti-correlated or un-
correlated when averaged over all possible history strings.
Besides, the dynamics is very close to the original MG if
all strategies are picked from the reduced strategy space
[3]. In this formalism, the crowd-anticrowd theory states
that every pair of anti-correlated strategies contributes
independently to the variance of attendance σ2 [8, 9].
To understand the difference in volatility between
3MGreal and MGrand, we first review the periodic dy-
namics observed in the symmetric phase of MGreal
[6, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12]. First, a prominent period 2M+1
peak in the Fourier transform of the minority choice time
series for MGreal is found. We call this phenomenon “pe-
riod 2M+1 dynamics”. In addition, a conspicuous period
two peak in the Fourier transform of the time series of
the minority choice conditioned on an arbitrary but fixed
history string in MGreal is also observed. We refer this as
the “period two dynamics” in our subsequent discussions.
Note that the above two dynamics are also observed by
replacing the minority choice with attendance.
For MGreal in the symmetric phase, the number of
strategies at play is much larger that the reduced strat-
egy space size. So, it is likely that each strategy in a re-
duced strategy space is assigned to more than one player
in this phase. Initially, for a given history string µ, ev-
ery alternative has equal chance to win. And the virtual
score of a strategy β that has correctly predicted the
winning alternative is increased by one while that of its
anti-correlated strategy β¯ is decreased by one. Since the
M -bit history string in MGreal provides complete infor-
mation of the winning choices in the previous M turns,
players will prefer to use strategy β to β¯ at the time when
the same history string appears next. As more players
are using the strategy β in the symmetric phase, these
players are less likely to guess the minority choice cor-
rectly. In MGreal, the history strings of two consecutive
turns are highly correlated. Actually, one can convert the
history string in turn t to that of turn (t+1) by deleting
the (t−1−M)th turn minority choice from one end of the
former string and then appending the minority choice in
turn t to the other end. Using these observations, Chal-
let and Marsili studied the dynamics of MGreal by means
of a de Bruijn graph [6]. A consequence of their anal-
ysis is that the history strings in the symmetric phase
from the (2Mk + 1)th to the [2M (k + 1)]th turn is likely
to form a de Bruijn sequence for any natural number k.
In other words, for any natural number k, an arbitrar-
ily given history string µ is likely to appear exactly once
between (2Mk + 1)th and [2M (k + 1)]th turns. Besides,
the history µ is likely to appear exactly twice between
(2M+1k + 1)th and [2M+1(k + 1)]th turns — one of the
turn at which a particular alternative wins and the other
turn at which the same alternative loses. As a result, it
is highly probable that the virtual scores of all strategies
in the (2M+1k + 1)th turn agree. Since the decision of
a player depends on the difference between the virtual
scores of his/her strategies, the dynamics of the game
MGreal has a strong tendency to “reset” itself once every
2M+1 turns. This is the origin of the period two and pe-
riod 2M+1 dynamics [6, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12]. Because of the
above two constraints on the history time series, the time
series of the minority choice as well as that of the virtual
score of a strategy in MGreal are not random walks.
From the above discussions, we know that the existence
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FIG. 3: The auto-correlation function C0 of the minor-
ity choice time series averaged over 50 runs for (a) MGreal
and (b) MGrand. The parameters used in both plots are
N = 1616, M = 5 and S = 2.
of period 2M+1 dynamics is closely related to the follow-
ing three facts that are unique for MGreal: the M -bit
history string gives complete information on the winning
alternatives in the previous M turns, the virtual score
of a strategy is updated according to the current his-
tory string, and history strings of two consecutive turns
are highly correlated. In contrast, for MGrand, the his-
tory string does not correlate with the winning alterna-
tives, the virtual score is updated according to the histor-
ical winning alternatives rather than the randomly gen-
erated history string, and the randomly generated his-
tory strings in two distinct turns are uncorrelated. Con-
sequently, although MGrand has a uniformly distributed
history, it does not have a mechanism to ensure the game
to “reset” itself once every 2M+1 turns. Thus, there is no
reason for its history time series to follow a period 2M+1
dynamics. Indeed, the auto-correlation on the minority
choice time series in Fig. 3 confirms the absence of period
2M+1 dynamics in MGrand although Fig. 4 shows that
MGrand still exhibits period two dynamics. Our find-
ing is consistent with Lee’s observation that the history
occurrence probability density function for MGreal and
MGrand are different [7]. To summarize, for a sufficiently
small α, the entropy of the minority choice time series
for MGrand is higher than that of MGreal.
We have gathered enough information to explain the
discrepancy in the σ2/N against α curves between MGreal
and MGrand. Recall that period two dynamics is ob-
served in the symmetric phase of both games. This is
because a significant number of players are using a par-
ticular strategy. And according to the crowd-anticrowd
theory, this results in a high volatility in the symmet-
ric phase in both games [8, 9]. Further recall that the
game MGreal is very likely to “reset” itself once every
2M+1 turns leading to the period 2M+1 dynamics in the
symmetric phase. In contrast, there is no mechanism
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FIG. 4: The auto-correlation function Cµ
0
of the minority
choice time series conditioned on a given history string µ av-
eraged over 50 runs for (a) MGreal and (b) MGrand. The
parameters used are the same as that in Fig. 3.
to “reset” the game MGrand once a while for α ≪ αc.
Therefore, the absolute deviation of the virtual score dif-
ference between two distinct strategies for MGreal is less
than that for MGrand whenever α ≪ αc. Consequently,
a player in MGrand is more likely to stick to a strategy.
Hence, players in MGrand cooperate slightly better than
those in MGreal in the symmetric phase. This explains
why for any given sufficiently small α, the variance of at-
tendance per player σ2/N for MGreal is higher than that
of MGrand.
Why do the σ2/N against α curves for MGreal and
MGrand coincide in the symmetric phase in the simula-
tions of Cavagna [5], Challet and Zhang [6] together with
Lee [7]? We believe this is due to the finite size effect
as they picked N = 101 and S = 2 in their simulations.
Due to the small number of players and the small value of
M involved, the fluctuation between different runs over-
whelms the discrepancy between MGreal and MGrand.
After discussing the reason why σ2
real
and σ2
rand
differ,
we move on to explain the two scaling relations (1)–(2).
Researchers have argued that σ2 is well approximated by
a function of α only [3, 10]. Indeed, when α >∼ 0.1 and
hence the number of strategies at play is at most ten
times the reduced strategy space size, the above approxi-
mation is reasonably good for MGreal and MGrand. Nev-
ertheless, our simulation shows that this approximation
breaks down in MGreal when α <∼ 0.1. On the other hand,
using mean field approximation, Manuca et al. showed
that
σ2 ≈
N
4
+
N2
3 · 2M
χ2(S) (3)
where χ is a slow varying function of S provided that α≪
αc [11]. Since the correlation between history strings in
successive turns is ignored in this derivation, the scaling
relation (1) is applicable to MGrand in the regime of α <∼
0.1. In contrast, our simulation shows that this relation
is not applicable to MGreal in the same regime.
Since we have already argued that σ2real(M,S)/N ≥
σ2
rand
(M,S)/N in the symmetric phase, in order to prove
the validity of relation (2), it suffices to show that
σ2
real
(M,S) and σ2
rand
(M,S) both scale as N2. According
to the crowd-anticrowd theory, for a sufficiently small α,
all players in MGreal hold strategies whose virtual scores
are similar. Therefore, most players will not stick to a
particular strategy when making their choices. Besides,
the existence of period two dynamics in the symmet-
ric phase implies that both σ2
real
and σ2
rand
scales as N2
[8, 9, 10, 11]. Thus, relation (2) holds.
Finally, we briefly explain why σ2 decreases as M in-
creases. Since the average time between successive ap-
pearances of a given history increases exponentially with
M , the absolute deviation of virtual score difference be-
tween two distinct strategies increases. Therefore, the
period two dynamics is weakened. So, σ2 for MGreal and
MGrand decreases as M increases.
OUTLOOK
In this paper, we report that history is relevant in de-
termining the mean variance of attendance per player for
MG in the symmetric phase when α <∼ 0.2 by an exten-
sive numerical simulation using real and random histo-
ries. We explain our finding using crowd-anticrowd the-
ory. Although all graphs shown in this paper are drawn
by fixing the number of strategies per player S to 2 and
by letting the strategies to be drawn from the full strat-
egy space, our conclusions apply equally well to the case
of S > 2 as well as the case of drawing strategies from
the reduced strategy space. Our findings show that the
feedback mechanism buried under the correlation in the
history time series is important in the study of volatility
in the minority game.
It is instructive to study the relevance of history in the
parameter region of 0.2 <∼ α ≤ αc. Our numerical simu-
lation suggests that memory is irrelevant in this regime
and hence the symmetric phase of MG can be subdivided
into two phases. Further investigation is needed to test
our hypothesis.
Finally, it would be nice if one could analytically solve
the dynamics of the game in the symmetric phase. Since
the difference in σ2/N for MGreal and MGrand in the sym-
metric phase originates from the in period 2M+1 dynam-
ics, any such attempt must take the periodic dynamics of
the minority choice time series into account — something
that all attempts using replica trick [13, 14] and generat-
ing functional method [15, 16] so far have not been very
successful to incorporate.
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